rary professionals o r whether they're doctors rhar are doing an
exchange or academics, ir doesn't marrer. There's a cultural understanding and growth that occurs through rhis program and our o ther
human itarian programs that, in rhe long term, is a huge, huge be nefit.
So rhe individual contacts and mutual understanding that develop are
as valuable as anyth ing else.

NK: \X' har role d o you th ink rhc rnilir.uy can pl.ty in \t.mdarJ , for
d cmin ing rcc.. hno logy?

We have DoD-funded programs rhar can help with that type of thing,
and that's rhe type of partnership that I think really goes a long way ro
rhe mutual benefit of everybody concerned-the United Stares, rhe
partner nation, the NGOs we partner with, rhe United States m il itary,
the partner nation military, and rhe ultimate beneficiary being rhe
mem bers of rhe community that live there. That's where I think we
can make rhe most money and get the most yardage our of rh is program.

N K : Do you think the mili tilfy i' hertl'J 'u itc:d for m ine acrion rha n

LTC C: l rhink rhe roles that we have right now wirh the HDTC
doing the training rhcy do, plus the OSD SO/ LI C [Office of the
Secrctaty of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity
Conflict] research and development folks do absolutely tremendous
work. I wouldn't say it needs to be adjusted. They wi ll go to a country, look ar a particular situation in terms of terrain, weather, where
rhe communities are located-any number of facrors-and they'll
look at ir and say, "You know what might help here is a piece of equipment or some sort of technology rhar could do this." Well whatever ir
is they chink would work best doesn't exist, so rhey will go manufacture that, and rhc:y'll rake it down to this country a nd they'll rest it.
And the Office of the Secretary of Defense fully funds rhar program.
We've gor equipment down in Ho nduras right now that rhey're doing
a final rest on. The benefits to rhe partner nation are absolutely
tremendous, and from a techno logy standpoint, it's those guys who
work om of OSD SO/LI C a t Fort Belvoir, Vi rginia, that bring a huge
amount to the table, whether it's experimenting with unma nned aerial vehicles, wirh ground penetrating radar ro idenrif)t m ines-rhose are
tremendous technological advances that we ca n capitalize o n .
NK: Wh.n d u you rhink is rhe role fil r the mili t.try in m ine ri>k
.:d uc...ll ion .rnd victim assisranc.:?
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LTC C: That's rwo separate questions, so I'd like ro answer each separately. In mine risk education, our role is ro work wirh rhe communities and through the community leaders ro help them develop a
good solid mine risk education program . You know, kids are kids, and
so ofte n, as you know, children are the victims of land mines; people
working in rhe agricultural community are rhe victims of land mines.
Our role is to help the communities in which they live develop srrong
programs char are coherem, rhar receive rhe necessary funding, thar are
we ll enough pur rogether so that they're sustai ned, thereby reducing
the number of landmine victims while rhe demincrs go ahead and ger
an area cleared of mines.
The other question ... that is a great question , and I was
talking to the guys from rhe Polus Ccnrer, because in rhe HMA
Program we really don't have a role in victim assistance. Bur we have
other programs within Southern Command rhat ca n assist wirh that.
We have a humanitarian assistance program. W e have humanitarian
and civic assistance programs. I would see an example of an organ ization like rhe Polus Center working in Leon, Nicaragua, where we've
also worked, primarily after Hurricane Mitch, when Southern
Com mand provided both immed iate and long-term disaster rel ief and
reconsrrucrion ro Central America. In Leon, they have a victim assistance center that need s renovation o r they're trying to build a new o ne.

the h uman itarian s.:cror?

LTC C: I wouldn't say that at all. I wou ld say there are professionals
in the humanitarian sector, and 1 would say there are professionals
in the military. We arc nor at all interested in competing. We're imercsrcd in working together to solve mumal problems rhar affecr the
world community.

The Role of

Military Technical Advisors

N K: T hat was something you ' pok.: about earlier- partnerships
and how im porr.rnr they .rre. I "'1.' wonde ring how you th ink
rhe mil itary can compkm.:nr other o rg,m it.ttiom worki ng in huma nit.lria n dcmining.

LTC C : W hen I was just mentioning the humanitarian assista nce
program, I rhink rhar's a great example. We've partnered wirh anumber of NGOs throughout the region al ready, both international
NGOs, the larger ones, as well as local, community-based civic acrion
groups. Our partnersh ip opportuni ties arc more lim ited by imagination than they are by fu nd ing. Now, we certai nly have some real-world
concerns; we can't, from a military standpoint, say, "O K, let's go do
rhis type of project in this a rea" just because somebod y's asked us ro,
bur there are many, many cases where there is a confluence of interest,
and those need ro be pursued vigorously ro make sure rhar we generate a sort of synergy through the confluence of interest and maximize
all of our capabilities ro achieve whatever particular objective ir may be
ar rhe time-whether it's education, whether it's health, whether it's,
as you mentioned, victim assisrance, rhar's another area rhar parmersh ips are certainly viable.
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Introduction
In 1989 a multinational contingent of soldiers began to
arrive in Pakistan tO support a humanitarian mine action program for
Afghan refugees. They were, in effect, Technical Advisors (TAs) in rhe
fi eld of humani ta rian mine action, and in rhe years since, military TAs
have participated in m any other programs. This has nor been withom
irs controversial aspects.
For rhe purposes of chis discussion (and acknowledging char
some will not fir rh is description precisely) a military TA is a serving
soldier who is attached ro a humanitarian mine action program in a
training, advisory and memoring capacity. The military TA differs
from visiting military forces in three respects. He or she is nor-or
should nor be- a short-term visiror, bur rather is in theTA position
for a period of six months ro one year. The military TA is nor parr of
a fo rmed military unit, although national contingents within a program are usually under rhe command of their senior representative for
adm inistrative, personnel and disciplinary purposes. Finally, he or she
is nor armed and may nor necessarily wear a uniform.
l must confess a certain bias on my part. I have been a mi litary TA and I am immodest enough ro believe rhat my efforrs were
nor e ntirely in vain. I have also known and worked with many military TAs, from my own country and from others, and while they were
nor all well-suited ro rhe task, I believe rhar most of them did good
work. Somewhat inevitably, therefore, I am going to conclude rhar the
use of military T As is not a bad thing. I have structured rhis discussion
according to what I perceive ro be the three main concerns: ability,
money and philosophy. Or, more simply, can they do the job, how
m uch do they cost and should they be doing it an}'\vay?

by Rohan Maxwell, M ajor, Canadian Army
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Much of the d ebate revolves around rhe ability of military
T As to train, advise and mentor indigenous personnel in various positions within rhe organization . These positions can be grouped in to
three categories: rhe training and supervision required for specific mine
action tasks, such as finding and destroying mines; the training, logistics, planning, and command and control required fo r daily operations; and strategic planning, including integration with other development activities and resource management.
With respect to the first category, much has been made of
the difference berween military-style minefield breaching and rhe exigencies of humanitaria n demining. This difference undeniably existsin immediate combat. H owever, even in wartime, follow-on activities
are expected to achieve a high standard, and posr-confli cr clearance is
expected to reach what is effectively a huma nitarian standard. The
same is true of military demining activities in rhe context of modern
peace-support operations. It would be disingenuous to suggest that
milira1y personnel do not possess the techniques to reach rhis standard,
or the ability to understand and apply rhe International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) .
Experienced mine action workers have stated that military
and humanitarian demining d o not differ at the point where the deminer and the ground come together, 1 and that military-style training is
applicable ro the training of humanitarian deminers. 2 It has also been
acknowledged that mili tary personnel can successfully form and train
teams of deminers,3 even though many of these trainers lack "live"
expe rience4 and even though some countries forbid their personnel
from conducting actual demining while working as trainers.5
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that military personnel can
effectively teach specific technical tasks such as d emining and explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques, although they are not ad ept at
tasks such as mine risk education (MRE), where there is no clear military equivalent.6
Since there is an acknowledged need for qualified and experienced instructors,? it appears that there is a valid role for suitable military T As at this level so long as the tasks coincide with their skills. As
with any other job, rhe key word is "suirabiliry. " Technical skills and
knowledge are not sufficient: military T As, like civilian T As, must be

agencies.13 That bei ng said, senior officers in most armed forces have
ro possess strategic planning and resource management skills if they
are ro carry out their military duties wirh reasonable proficie ncy. This
is perhaps most notable in Western military establishments, where the
language used in many documents and meetings echoes that found in
civilian organizations, and where M.B.A. studies have assumed a status formerly reserved only for
advanced military training
courses.
A 1997 interview
with the (military) Chief
Technical Advisor (CTA) of
the Cam bodian Mine Action
Center (CMAC) appeared to
show a sound grasp of mine
action realities. He discussed
the need to build a sustainable demining program with
local buy-in, the desirabili ty
of a long-term approach by
donors and others, and the
importance of "weaving
together the various parts of
the program" by a pplying
business princi ples. He also
spoke of capacity building
and of the requirem ent for a
comprehensive national survey and an associated database in order to
support long-range planning.14 T he ability of military personnel ro
adapt to the exigencies of mine action does of course depend on the
individuals concerned , bur the option of using them should not be dismissed out of hand.

of a high caliber, able to transmit their ski lls and knowledge effectively in a given culrural, environmental and organizational context, and
remain in place long enough to be of real value.8 Ideally these requirements would be incorporated into the selection process used by rhe
providing country, but there is no guarantee rhar this wi ll be rhe case.9
Ir has been suggested that the receiving agency should play
a decisive role in the selection process, IO but this is unlikely to occur
under the most typical scena rio, where the receiving agency asks for
assistance and nations respond by sending the military TAs of their
choice. The militaiy personnel management system of the supplying
country dominates this process, and it will continue to do so while
military TAs are seconded to, rather than hi red by, the receiving agencies. T his means that the suitability of an arriving military TA will be,
to a limited extent, rhe luck of rhe draw. This is defini tely not the preferred staffi ng solution; however, my own limited experience working
with and within international organizations-and more relevantly the
judgement of those wirh more experience-suggests that rhis problem
is nor necessarily limited ro the group under discussion. 11
Military TAs have also achieved success in the second caregory, daily operations. One example is given by the Geneva
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in The
Role of the Military in Mine Action: "... military T As provided an
invaluable injection of expertise at a time when Cambodia was struggling to rebuild its government and economy. Foreign military T As
appear to have been particularly effective at getting demining teams on
the ground."i2 T his makes sense, since deploying a nd sustaining large
numbers of persons to work on difficult tasks, under demanding conditions, is fundamental to milira1y operations. Given the personnel
and material resources (however scarce those might be) and specific
tasks within an assigned area of operations, military T As can perform
effectively at this level.
In contrast, most observers appear to believe that the military has little if any role in the third category: strategic planning,
resource ma nagement and integration wirh the wider developmental
effort. T his roo makes sense as sustai nable development is not a core
military skill, or is nor likely ro becom e one. As rhe United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) has noted, military personnel can
assist in this category, up to a point, but in the long rerm, rhe requisite training a nd assistance should be provided by more appropriate

Money
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Although some believe that milita1y personnel represent a
net savings ro rhe receiving organization because their salaries are
already paid, l5 a more com mon assessment appears to be that milira1y
TAs, person for person , are rather m ore expensive than civilian staff.
The GICHD's comprehensive study states, " ... the incremental costs
associated with any foreign dury assignment of personnel from visiting
milira1y forces may be at least as high as the full cost of engaging equally well-qualified civilian personnel for the same assignment." 16 If this
were rrue, then it would clearly be a rational decision on the part of
the receiving organizations to eschew the use of military TAs. But is it
rrue?
The authors of the study cite rwo sources in arriving at this
conclusion. The first is a paper by rhe Organization for Economic
Cooperation and D evelopment (OECD), which correctly points our
that military operations are more expensive than civilian ones: a military airlift will cost more rhan a civilian one, a militaiy medical facility will cost more than a civilian one, and so on. This is undeniable,
even though the extra cost is not borne by the receiving agency (a
point that is acknowledged in the paper). 17 As others have nored, iris
true that "M ilitary unirs cost more for a given operation than the
equivalent carried out by a civil organization. " 18 However, we are discussing individuals, and it is a bit of a stretch to compare something

like rhc airlift of relief supplies into Somalia with the deployment of
individual military T As.
The second source is an American analysis rhar seeks to
quantify rhe incremental cost of deploying an individual soldier on
peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) or Kosovo.
The range given is $200,000 ro $250,000 (U.S.), a nd it is essentially
calculated by d ividing the
total annual cost of each
force by the number of soldiers involved. The incremental cost per so ldier,
therefore, includes his or her
share of the operating cosrs
of everything used by or in
support of American forces
stationed in BiH or Kosovo.
That is, everything from helicopters ro armoured vehicles ro camps to ammunition ro hospitals, for the
richest army in the world. 19
Obviously a military TA,
operating sans artille ry,
armored vehicles or a rrack
helicopters will be cheaper.
The GICHD study takes
this into account by lopping
off a third of the incremental cost, thus arriving at a range of $135,000
to $ 165,000 per year.20
This still seems like a he fry sum; as the study no res, ir is "as
much or more than appropriately qualified, experienced and morivared civilian personnel would cost (including recruitment and administrative support costs) if recruited directly." 21 It is true thar rhe receiving agency would bear the entire cost of a civilian TA, while most of
rhe cost of a military TA would be borne by the supplying nation. This
might appeal ro a pragmatic mine acrion manager, who might rake the
view that if there is ro be an incremental cost, ir would be better borne
by a la rge government rather than a relatively small mine action program. Still, the price seems inordinately high, irrespective of who is
actually paying. If it really were that high, governments would be better advised to conserve their military personnel for other purposes a nd
send the m oney rhus saved ro mine action programs for civilian staff.
The rrouble is that rhe marh does not work out. T he lower
end of the proposed range translates to about $12,000 per month in
incremental costs, a nd it is difficult to arrive ar that sum without
reaching levels of generosity not normally associated with the military.
Salary, medical and dental coverage, insurance, pension contributions
and so on arc nor incremental costs. Neither are living allowances or
local operating costs such as vehicles, drivers and interpreters, because
they would be rhe same for any TA, whether military or civilian. This
means that the entire incremental cost has to be de rived from military
allowances, administrative support and transpo rtation costs for
deployment, redeployment and home leave. Even if a T A fli es home
once a month and is an acure administrative challenge, $ 12,000
equates to an improbably high monthly allowance. Some militaries are
quire genero us, but even so it would be difficult to arrive at a monthly inc reme ntal cost in excess of $2,500 or thereabouts. Adding more
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rhan a bir for luck would give an annual increme ntal cosr of, say,
$48,000: hardly eno ugh ro recruit, pay and administer a civilian TA.
I have belabored rhis point because I believe ir is chimerical.
T he ofT-repeated assertion rhar military T As are mo re expensive is
demonstrably incorrect, no marrer who is paying. One simply can nor
exrrapolare from rhe per capita incremenral cosr of a fu ll-scale military
operation, or even per capita incremenral cosr of "borrowing" soldiers
from visiting military forces, ro rhe incremental cosr of deploying an
unarmed military TA wirh no logistics, communicatio ns o r infrastructure support beyond rhar which would also be provided to a civilian
TA. While debates over rhe relative quality of military and civilian TAs
cannot be conclusively settled because borh groups arc comprised of
individuals whose abilities vary widely, cost is a quantitative issue char
can be eliminated from the debate altogether.

Philosophy
If we accept rhar rhe question of abiliry is ar least sci II open
and char rhe question of money has been addressed, we are le fr wirh
philosophical argumenrs. This aspecr of che debare is a relarivcly fa inr
echo of rhe ongoing concroversy over rhe role of military forces in
humanitarian operations, and of rhe ofr-cxaggerared "culwral" differences between milirary and civilian personnel. A key elemenr of chis
w ider conrroversy-rhe abiliry of milicary personnel ro carry our
humanitarian rasks- has already been addressed in rhis arricle.
Anorher concern is related ro security. This argumenr suggests char humanitarian workers may be endangered because bell igerenrs won' t be able ro disti ngu ish between military and civilian pe rsonnel who are engaged in similar work, or because humani tarian workers
may become cargers by virrue of association with the mil itary.
However, attacks o n humanitarian workers (such as chose char have
taken place in Afghanistan) are nor carried o ur because of confusion
over rhe mili rary or civilian status of rhe victims, or because of a perceived rainr due ro civil-m ilirary cooperation; rhcy arc carried o ur
because rhe arrackers w ish ro drive away humanitarian workers.
The lasr philosophical argumcnr can be summarized as "lr
isn' t rheir busi ness," with a subrexr rhar rhe rnilirary is only interested
in humanitarian mine acrion because rhey are looking for gainful
employment in orde r ro jusrify rheir existence. In response ro rhe firsr
point I would suggest thar ir's the business of anyone who can make an
cfTecrivc conrriburion ro rhe efTorr, and rhar the only " turf' we should
be concerned about is rhar concealing rhe mines. As for the second
po inr, rhe armies char normally provide TAs seem robe busy e no ugh
these days. Furthermore, in rhe smaller armies, mi litary TAs are drawn
from a numerically small pool, and chose arm ies are ofren less rhan
anxious ro send scarce officers and non-commissio ned officers (NCOs)
ofT ro do work rhac they feel is nor che military's business!

Conclusion
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Altho ugh relarive qualiry is difficult co assess, the average
abil iry of m ili tary TAs is o n par wirh rhe resr of rhe humani tarian mine
action community and che fina ncial and p hilosophical argumenrs
against their use do nor srand up ro examination. Military TA~ are a
useful and usable resource, and since it would be srarding indeed co
hear a m ine acrion manager complain of a surfeit of resources, I must
conclude-as promised- char humanitarian m ine actio n benefirs fro m

the use of military TAs.
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Use of

BELGIAN MILITARY EXPERTS
For many years, a large debate over the use of military
experts in humanitarian demining has existed. Some individuals
are against military demining arguing the military performs different techniques and holds different priorities from humanitarian demining. Others are favourable toward military demining, as
they are the majority of demining centres. The Belgian military
has been active in demining since World War I (WWI). Still
today, explosive remnants from WWI and World War II (WWII)
remain a daily concern in the life of Belgians. The minefields
have been cleared for many years, yet everyday military experts
still dispose of UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). It
is important to understand this process does not take place during a military operation. Rather it is placed within the framework
of helping the population, a type of humanitarian demining.
Hi1tory
The explosive o rdnance disposal
(EOD) service was created immediately after
WWl. This service was acrive throughout
Belgium, initially as a decachmenr ro each
Provincial Recovery Service. In I 922, many
landmines we re disposed of, givi ng th e
impression ic would only take a few months ro
complere che project. Unfortunately, it
became clear rhe UXO problem was far from
over. In an effort to cackle this issue, rhe
O rdnance Disposal Service was created o n
Octo ber 3, I 923 .
After WWII , numerous Belgian
m ilitary unirs were directed ro dispose of the
obstacles and m ines la id in bo th world wars.
T hese unirs were sent rhroughour Belgi um.
On August 16, 1941 , rhe EOD service was
recreated, afrer rhe captive pe rsonnel were
freed , ro dispose of all explosive devices and

preserve any d evices of military importance.
Bomb d isposal reams quickly formed in rowns
char suffe red from bo mbing during the wars
and in places where old minefields, ammunition dumps or explosive charges were discovered. The EOD service activities conrinually
exceeded rhe casks emrusred ro ir by staying in
constant conracr with several resistance groups
and wirh allies. Through this constant interaction, EOD was able to inform London of p ossible manu facturing errors in fusing sysccms
and of likely causes of non-exploding bombs.
The bo mb disposal experts also recovered
explosives of defused devices and passed o n
rhe remaining explosive fille rs to resistance
groups for sabotage purposes.
On Ocrobe r 16, 1944, the
Explosive O rdnance and Obscacle Disposal
Service was creared as a n official addicio n ro
rhe EO D service and Belgian Armed Forces.
In the first year, 300 men worked under chis

by Captain Vincent Muylkens, Belgian
Defense Staff Operations & Training EOD

in EOD
servtcc. The Explosive Ordnance D isposal
Service was created on December I , 1945, ro
unite a ll exisring bomb disposal un its under
one single command.
Between 1944 and 1948, rhe EOD
service srrucrure changed co nstantly as
Belgium search for an ideal organ ization and
due ro rhc Bomb Disposal Unir consran rly
decreasing inside. Likewise, afrer WWll, rhe
authorities believed an EOD service was no
longer necessary. The abolition of rhis service
was again imminenr. However, on July 4,
I947, a d ifferent decision was made-ro
reduce irs srrengrh ro 42 men. Fortunately chis
decision was never broughr ro execution , and
by rhe end of 1948, rhe EOD service consisted of 350 me n. T he Explosive Ordnance and
Obsracle Disposal Service held a temporary
unir sraws unril May I, 1948, whe n ic became
an organization of the basic Armed Forces.
Between I 949 and I 955, rhe EOD service saw
ma ny changes, essenrially as a resulc of che
reorgani7.-ation of rhe Armed Forces. Ar the
e nd of 1955, rhe EOD service had decreased
ro 11 5 personnel.
In O ctober 1971 , the army dete rmined rhe EOD service would no lo nger be an
independent unit. However, the early 1970s
consisted of inrernacional terrorism, which
meanr a need for Belgian specialists capable of
d isposing booby traps, letter bombs, car
bombs, etc. Furthermore, rhe number of leftover munirions from the two world wars
exceed ed the previous estimates. Each year,
ch e EOD service received 3,000-4,000
req uests ro dispose of devices of all kinds. Less
rha n three years after its dissolution rhe EOD
service was again creared on August I, 1974.

Ill
M
(/1

::::>
(,)

0
L&.

